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ABSTRACT
In the past decades, the application of secure multiparty compu-
tation (MPC) to machine learning, especially privacy-preserving
neural network training, has attracted tremendous attention from
both academia and industry. MPC enables several data owners to
jointly train a neural network while preserving their data privacy.
However, most previous works focus on semi-honest threat model
which cannot withstand fraudulent messages sent by malicious
participants. In this work, we propose a construction of efficient n-
party protocols for secure neural network training that can secure
the privacy of all honest participants even when a majority of the
parties are malicious. Compared to the other designs that provides
semi-honest security in a dishonest majority setting, our actively
secured neural network training incurs affordable efficiency over-
heads. In addition, we propose a scheme to allow additive shares
defined over an integer ring ZN to be securely converted to addi-
tive shares over a finite field ZQ . This conversion scheme is essen-
tial in correctly converting shared Beaver triples in order to make
the values generated in preprocessing phase to be usable in online
phase, which may be of independent interest.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Privacy-preserving protocols.
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1 INTRODUCTION
During this last decade, with the development of machine learn-
ing, especially deep neural network (DNN), the scenario where dif-
ferent parties, e.g., data owners or cloud service providers, jointly
solve a machine learning problem while preserving their data pri-
vacy has attracted tremendous attention from both academia and
industry. Federated learning scheme [45] seems to offer the possi-
bility for distributed privacy-preserving machine learning, focus-
ing on cross-device and cross-silo setting [39]wheremultiple clients
train local models using their raw data, then aggregate their mod-
els under the coordination of a central server. However, there is
still no formal privacy guarantee to this baseline learning model.
Therefore, secure multiparty computation (MPC) [31] as a practi-
cal mature privacy-preserving technique aiming to enable multi-
ple parties jointly evaluating a function, is natural to be applied to
address such privacy issues of training neural networks in a dis-
tributed manner.
Previous Results: There have been several schemes proposed
to perform distributed neural network. This research direction is
arguably pioneered by the design of SecureML by Mohassel and
Zhang[47] where they propose several MPC-friendly activation
functions to enable neural network training on secret shared data.
The study of neural network on shared data can be classified to
several classes based on their goals, number of parties and threat
model. First, some models focus on the neural network prediction.
A scheme designed for neural network prediction called MiniONN
[44] was constructed based on the design of SecureML[47]. With
the extensive use of packing techniques and additive homomor-
phic encryption (AHE) cryptosystem along with garbled circuit,
Gazelle[38] provides a neural network prediction protocol with a
more efficient linear computation.
Secondly, some other models provides secure neural network
training for two active parties providing security against one cor-
rupted party. As discussed above, SecureML [47] provides us with
a neural network training protocol for two parties which is secure
against semi-honest adversary controlling one party. Chameleon
[54] proposes a different neural network training protocol for two
parties. Instead of using the relatively more costly oblivious trans-
fer (OT) protocols, the design relies on the use of external par-
ties that aid the computation without having their own private
inputs. In this case, the protocol is proven to be secure against semi-
honest adversary under honest majority setting. ABY[30] presents
a framework of efficient conversion between various two-party
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computation schemes to support different machine learning algo-
rithms. It is proven to be secure against semi-honest adversary
controlling one party. SecureNN[59] relies on more sophisticated
protocols and up to two non-colluding external parties to provide
neural network training protocols for two active parties. Its secu-
rity is guaranteed against semi-honest adversary controlling up
to 1 party. QUOTIENT [4] deeply integrates OT protocols with
advanced neural network techniques such as ternary weight neu-
ral network [43] in 2-server setting against semi-honest adversary
controlling 1 of the two servers. Note that all the designs men-
tioned here are designed for two parties with only semi-honest
security guarantee with number of corrupted parties being at most
half of the total number of participating parties. Despite some ef-
forts to extend these designs to a larger number of active parties[46],
the improvement has been rather limited.
Lastly, there have also been some designs dedicated for system
with more than two parties with active security guarantee in dis-
honest majority setting. Most of theseworks are based on the SPDZ
scheme[28]. These works[20, 24, 56] utilizes SPDZ to provide sev-
eral accurate and efficient machine learning algorithms. Neverthe-
less, these works only rely on existing libraries, such as SCALE-
MAMBA [7] and FRESCO [5], which do not offer primitives and
optimizations for neural network training. Therefore, in this work,
we present dedicated MPC protocols based on SPDZ for convolu-
tional neural networks (CNN) training and demonstrate that our
protocols obtain active security with affordable overheads com-
pared to the existing secure neural network training in semi-honest
setting.
For SPDZ protocol, the main efficiency improvement and ac-
tive security come from the extensive use of pre-computed Beaver
triples [9] with Message authentication code (MAC) (see Section
3.2) to accelerate arithmetic operations. During this last decade, fol-
lowing the initial scheme proposed in BDOZ [10],many researchers
have been working on protocols of efficient Beaver triple genera-
tion in malicious setting. Both HE based schemes such as [27, 28,
41], and OT based schemes such as [23, 40, 48] offer reasonable effi-
ciency and security. Relying on these schemes, all parties are able
to jointly generate Beaver triples over a finite field FQ or a ring
Z2k which can be directly used for MAC checking in the online
phase of SPDZ and its variants. Specifically, for HE based schemes,
we have to choose a proper crypto-system to be used in the of-
fline phase, e.g., leveled BGV [15] is used in [27, 41, 52] for its high
performance due to the extensive use of packing technique, e.g.,
single-instruction multiple data (SIMD) trick [57]. Unfortunately,
Beaver triples generated based on AHE crypto-systems over ZN ,
e.g., Paillier [53] or DGK [26] as used in SecureML [47], cannot be
directly used for the verification of standard SPDZ which is based
on a finite field. Therefore, an instance of SPDZ that is based on
Paillier or DGK requires a secure scheme to transform the triples
generated modulo ZN to the underlying field of the SPDZ, ZQ .
Our contributions: In this work, we propose construction of
efficient n-party protocols for secure CNN training in malicious
majority setting, including linear and convolutional layer, Recti-
fied Linear Unit (ReLU) layer, Maxpool layer, normalization layer,
dropout layer, and their derivatives. In addition, we present a se-
cure conversion scheme for shares defined over an integer ring ZN
to shares over a prime field ZQ which can also be used to correctly
convert shared Beaver triples. We believe that this result may be of
independent interest. Our experimental results show that our pro-
tocols for secure neural network training provide affordable over-
heads compared with existing schemes in semi-honest setting.
Organisation of the paper: The rest of the paper is organized
as follows. In Section 2, we provide notations and threat model
used in this paper, as well as a brief discussion of secure com-
putation and neural network. In Section 3, we introduce several
supporting protocols including Distributed Paillier crypto-system,
SPDZ protocol, and protocols of secure computation of fixed-point
numbers. Section 4 contains ourMPC protocols which can be used
to construct an efficient secure neural network protocol as illus-
trated in Section 5. Then we analyze the performance of our pro-
tocol in Section 6. Finally, we present our experimental evaluation
in Section 7 and give the conclusion in Section 8.
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Privacy Considerations in Neural Network
Training
Neural network consists ofmany layers with nodes defined by a set
of linear operations, such as addition and multiplication, and non-
linear operations such as ReLU, Maxpool, and dropout. At a very
high level, we represent a neural network as a function w = f (x)
where x represents the set of input data with their respective labels,
w represents the set of weights of neural network, and function f
can be represented with linear operations and non-linear opera-
tions as mentioned above. The target of training neural network is
to obtain these weights w which can be used to map a new unla-
beled data x∗ to its predicted label ℓ∗, i.e., prediction.
2.2 Secure multiparty computation
Privacy-preserving technology provides privacy guarantee for data
in various purposes such as for computation or for publishing. This
technology broadly encompasses all schemes for privacy preserv-
ing function evaluations, including but not limited to differential
privacy (DP), secure multiparty computation (MPC), and homo-
morphic encryption (HE). It is well known that DP provides a trade-
off between accuracy and privacy that can be mathematically ana-
lyzedwhileMPC andHE offer cryptographic privacy but with high
communication or computation overheads. In this work, we focus
on MPC to construct efficient neural network training protocols.
Since its general definition in [60], thanks to both theoretical and
engineering breakthroughs, MPC has moved from pure theoreti-
cal interests to practical implementations, e.g., Danish sugar beets
auction [13] and Estonian students study [12].
In addition to pure homomorphic encryption based MPC, there
are two schemes which can be used to construct MPC protocols,
i.e., circuit garbling and secret sharing. Circuit garbling, as used
in SecureML [47], involves encrypting and decrypting keys in a
specific order [8], while the latter emulates a function evaluation
more efficiently based on the "secretly-shared" inputs between all
parties. Our work leverages on an additive secret sharing MPC pro-
tocol called SPDZ (see Section 3.2), such that for each data x , it will
be randomly split up into n pieces and then be distributed among
n parties (see Algorithm 1 in Section 3.2). In the rest of the pa-
per, we write [x]t = [〈x1〉t , ..., 〈xn 〉t ] to denote x ∈ Zt being
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secretly shared between all parties such that each Pi holds 〈xi 〉t
and x =
∑n
i=1〈xi 〉t . For simplicity of notation, when the context is
clear, we abuse the notation and use xi instead of 〈xi 〉t , the share
of x owned by party Pi . Similarly, when the underlying space Zt
is clear from the context, we write [x] instead of [x]t .
2.3 Threat model and security
In many real life neural network applications, the training data are
distributed across multiple parties which are independent business
entities and are required to complywith the applicable data privacy
regulations. Therefore, due to the competitive nature of business
organizations, in this work, we consider the scenario where a ma-
jority of parties may collude to obtain the data from the other par-
ties by sending fraudulent messages to them. Such threat model is
the same as the one used in SPDZ, i.e. a security against malicious
adversary controlling up to n − 1 parties. This means that in an
n-party setting, such MPC protocol is secure even if n − 1 parties
are corrupted by a malicious adversary. Such threat model is differ-
ent from that of MPC protocols in SecureML [47] and SecureNN
[59], which are against semi-honest adversary. As demonstrated
in [22], semi-honest protocols can be elevated into the malicious
model, whichmay incur infeasible cost overhead. However, thanks
to the online-offline architecture of SPDZ, such overhead can be
moved from online phase to offline phase and thus the amortized
efficiency of function evaluation can be improved. Our security def-
inition is based on Universal Composability (UC) framework and
we refer interested readers to [16] for the details.
The correctness and security of our proposed protocol depends
on the supporting building blocks, i.e., distributed Paillier crypto-
system, SPDZ, and secure computationof fixed-point numbers. Data
representation follows the format in [18] andwe use standard SPDZ
scheme over a finite field ZQ . The subprotocol of SPDZ involved in
this works include protocol for data resharing Resharing(·), multi-
plicationMulTri(·), Paillier based Beaver triple generation TriGen(·),
andMAC checking. The details of all the abovementioned support-
ing protocols can be found in the Section 3.
3 SUPPORTING PROTOCOLS
3.1 Distributed Paillier cryptosystem
Paillier [53] is a public key encryption scheme that possesses par-
tial homomorphic property [3]. The public key is N = p · q and
the secret key is (p,q) pair where p and q are large primes. First,
we fix д to be a random invertible integer modulo N 2. The encryp-
tion of a messagem is defined to be c = E(m) = дmrN (mod N 2)
for a randomly chosen invertible r ∈ ZN . The decryption func-
tion is D(c) =
L
(
cλ( mod N 2)
)
L(дλ ( mod N 2)) mod N where function L is defined
as L(x) = x−1N and λ = φ(N ) where φ is Euler’s totient function.
Paillier supports homomorphic addition between two ciphertexts
and homomorphic multiplication between a plaintext and a cipher-
text, in particular, E(m1) ·E(m2) (mod N 2) = E(m1+m2 (mod N ))
and E(m1)m2 (mod N 2) = E(m1 · m2 (mod N )). For simplicity,
we denote the following two functions: E(m1 +m2 (mod N )) =
PAdd(E(m1),E(m2)) and E(m1 ·m2 (mod N )) = PMult(E(m1),m2).
We can easily generalize the two notations such that E(m1 +m2 +
· · · +mr (mod N )) = PAdd(E(m1),E(m2), · · · , E(mr )) and E(m1 ·
m2 · · · · ·mr (mod N )) = PMult(E(m1),m2, · · · ,mr ). Due to the
invertibility of д and r modulo N 2, it is easy to see that a Pail-
lier ciphertext is invertible modulo N 2. Hence, if c = E(m), we
will also have c−1 (mod N 2) to be a valid encryption of −m. We
denote PInv(E(m)) = E(−m (mod N )) ≡ E(m)−1 (mod N 2). Us-
ing PInv, Paillier can support homomorphic subtraction, E(m1 −
m2 (mod N )) = PAdd(E(m1), PInv(E(m2))). These homomorphic
properties enable several protocolsproposed in Section 3.2 and Sec-
tion 4. However, in terms ofMPC scenario, the secret key pair is not
allowed to be owned by any party. To keep the hardness of compos-
ite residuosity [37] used for the security of Paillier, the value of p
and q can not be known by anyone. Hence we need to generate the
public key in distributed manner and keep its factors secret while
still enabling joint decryption to be done without revealing the
private key. Fortunately, such distributed Paillier does exist. Dis-
tributed Paillier key generation includes two sub-protocols, i.e., (i)
distributed RSA modulus generation, and (ii) distributed biprimal-
ity test to verify the validity of generated RSA modulus in (i). In-
spired by [14] which proposed the first RSA modulus generation
protocol in multiparty setting, several works [32, 34, 49] provides
solutions in different threat models. Note that to ensure our pro-
tocol is secure against malicious adversaries, we have to guaran-
tee that all the sub-protocols are also secure against same threat
model in n-party setting. Thus we rely on the scheme proposed in
[35]. We denote the Paillier cryptosystem with plaintext space ZN
as PaillierN , as well as its encryption and distributed decryption,
i.e., EncN (·), DecN (·).
3.2 SPDZ
SPDZ is a well known secret sharing based MPC protocol against
malicious majority proposed in [28]. Following this initial some-
what homomorphic encryption (SHE) based work, several variants
are proposed including its improved version [27], OT based version
called MASCOT [40], improved SHE based version called Over-
drive [41], and the versions over Z2k such as SPDZ2k [23] and
Overdrive2k [52]. We will refer to all of these variants in SPDZ
family as SPDZ.
SPDZ consists of a pre-processing or offline phase, which is
independent from both the input data and the very efficient on-
line phase for function evaluation. In the offline phase, all parties
jointly generate some "raw materials", typically the Beaver triples
[9]. In the online phase, the parties only need to exchange some
shares and perform some efficient verification. The active security
is guaranteed by the MAC which enables the validation of parties’
behavior during computation. In the rest of this section, several
important techniques in SHE based SPDZ are introduced in order
to construct some higher level protocols proposed in Section 4.
Data Resharing: Given Enct (x), all parties can follow the pro-
tocol given in Algorithm 1 to obtain [x]t as the shares of x . We note
that this resharing of an encrypted value is only done during pre-
processing phase to help in the generation of auxiliary values and
it is not used in the sharing protocol of private inputs of the func-
tion f . For the sharing of private inputs during the online phase
of the computation, it follows the protocol given in Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 1 Data Resharing: [x]t ← Resharing(Enct (x))
1: Each party Pj publishes Enct (r j ), where r j is uniformly se-
lected from Zt .
2: All parties calculate Enct (r + x) =
PAdd(Enct (r1),Enct (r2), · · · ,Enct (rn),Enct (x)) using ho-
momorphic addition.
3: All parties jointly decrypt Enct (r + x) to obtain r + x .
4: P1 sets its share x1 = r + x − r1, Pj sets its share xj = −r j for
j , 1.
5: Return [x]t
Algorithm 2 Data Sharing: [x]t ← Share(x) where x is a private
value owned by Pi
Require: A shared random value [r ]t
1: Each party Pj sends his share of [r ]t , 〈r 〉tj to Pi enabling Pi to
recover the value of r .
2: Pi sets 〈x〉ti = x + r − 〈r 〉ti and for j , i, Pj sets 〈x〉ti = −〈r 〉tj .
3: Return [x]t = (〈x〉t1 , · · · , 〈x〉tn )
Arithmetic operation: SPDZ is based on secret sharing, thus
there is no communication cost for addition and scaling by a pub-
lic constant. Multiplication between two secretly shared values is
more complex but we can use the well known Beaver triple trick to
accelerate this operation. In the following discussion, all values are
secretly shared using the additive secret sharing scheme over the
same space. Assume that we have generated three secret shared
values [a], [b], and [c], called Beaver triples, such that c = a · b .
Given [x] and [y], all parties can follow the protocol in Algorithm
3 to calculate [x · y]. Correctness and security are proven in [9].
Note that all the protocols in SPDZ can be applied to matrices.
Algorithm 3 Multiplication based on Beaver triple: [x · y] ←
MulTri([x], [y], [a], [b], [c])
1: Each party Pi publishes xi − ai and yi − bi .
2: Each party Pi compute x − a and y − b .
3: P1 sets its share z1 = c1+ (x−a) ·b1+ (y−b) ·a1+ (x−a) · (y−b),
Pj sets its share z j = cj + (x − a) · bj + (y − b) · aj for j , 1.
4: Return [z]
Considering that 1 triple cannot be used to perform 2 multipli-
cations for privacy reason [10], the number of triples we need to
generate depends on the number of multiplications we want to
complete. Furthermore, these Beaver triples do not depend on in-
puts data as well as the function to be evaluated, which means
they can be generated at any point prior to evaluating the func-
tion, i.e., the offline phase in SPDZ, thus enabling highly efficient
online phase.
Beaver triple generation: Algorithm 4 describes the n-party
protocol for Beaver triple generation based on Paillier such that
[a]N , [b]N , [c]N ← TriGen(). For simplicity of discussion, we only
discuss the protocols under semi-honest setting. As discussed be-
fore, such protocols can be made secure against malicious adver-
sary by the combination of zero knowledge proof and standard
technique of sacrificing an auxiliary value to check the correct-
ness of another. A more detailed discussion of this technique can
be found in[55]. As mentioned in Section 1, these Beaver triples
generated using Algorithm 4 are over ZN , thus cannot be directly
in the online phase of SPDZ which is over a finite field..
Algorithm 4 Beaver triple generation based on Paillier:
[a]N , [b]N , [c]N ← TriGen()
1: Each party Pi publishes EncN (ai ) and EncN (bi ), where ai and
bi are uniformly selected from ZN .
2: Each party Pi computes EncN (a) =
PAdd(EncN (a1), · · · , EncN (an)).
3: Each party Pi computes and publishes EncN (a · bi ) =
PMult(EncN (a),bi ) = EncN (a)bi using homomorphic multi-
plication in Paillier.
4: Each party Pi computes EncN (c) = PAdd(EncN (a ·
b1), · · · , EncN (a,bn)).
5: All parties call Resharing(EncN (c)) to get [c]N .
6: Return [a]N , [b]N , [c]N
Note that in step 3 of Algorithm 4, only Pi knows the value ofbi ,
which enables the homomorphic multiplication between a plain-
text and ciphertext (refer Section 3.1), i.e., EncN (a) and bi , thus no
information leaks.
MAC checking: To obtain active security over ZQ , the main
idea of SPDZ is to use unconditional MAC which enables verifica-
tion of computation correctness. This authentication scheme pre-
vents parties from cheating on their interactive computation with
high probability. In SPDZ, to enable authentication, each private
value, including the Beaver triples that are generated, come with
their respective tags. To obtain this, first the parties agree on a
random MAC key α ∈ ZQ which is secretly shared among all par-
ties. To compute the tag of a secretly shared value [x]Q , the parties
compute [α · x]Q and store it along with their shares of [x]Q . We
can observe that if some adversaries cheat such that the secretly
shared value is changed from x to x ′, they can do so undetected
only if they can modify the corresponding tag [m] to [m′] such that
m′ = α .x ′. This means that the probability of cheating without
being detected is equal to the probability of guessing α correctly,
which is inversely proportional to the finite field sizeQ .When con-
sidering a similar scheme over a ring ZN , the security is no longer
as strong. This is due to the fact that, contrary to ZQ , not all non-
zero value in ZN is invertible. Because of this, the probability that
m′ = α .x ′ becomes larger. For example, if N = 2k and α = 2k−1,
m′ can only be either 0 or 1 making the probability 1/2. As illus-
trated above, we use Paillier to generate Beaver triples with MAC,
which means all the secret shared values are in ZN , hence we have
to convert all these shares from ZN to ZQ while preserving the re-
lationship between them. Note that for any sub-protocols, all the
inputs and outputs should always be secretly shared and not be
in clear. In addition to the shares of the outputs [y]Q , the parties
should also hold a secret share of their respective tags [α · y]Q .
3.3 Secure computation of fixed-point numbers
For typical neural networks, data and weights are represented by
floating point numbers. However, in terms of combining neural
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network with cryptographic techniques such as HE and MPC, we
have to use a very large finite field to preserve full accuracy [33].
Thismethod supports for only limited number ofmultiplications to
avoid the overflow, which is prohibitive for neural network where
a large number of multiplications are involved. Fortunately, the
authors in [47] illustrate that rational numbers can be treated as
fixed point number relying on a truncation technique while pre-
serving appropriate accuracy of neural network prediction. Other
prior works regarding neural network with MPC, such as [59] and
[4] also show their accuracy in terms of truncation. In our work,
we follow the same methodology and extend its applications to
secure n-party truncation, comparison, and arithmetic operations
based on the protocols given in [17, 18, 25, 58]. Note that the cor-
rectness of these protocols are given in above mentioned works
and security is guaranteed by the MAC-checking method in SPDZ.
Data representation: Rational numbers can be treated as a
sequence of digits including integer and fractional parts split by
a radix point. More specifically, for any real number x˜ , set e and
f as positive integers such that |x˜ | < 2e−1 and the storage accu-
racy is within 2−f . Then we can find a sign bit s ∈ {0, 1} and
d−f , · · · ,de−2 ∈ {0, 1} such that x˜ = (−1)s ·
∑e−2
i=−f di2
i . To encode
x˜, we first encode it as an integer x¯ by multiplying it by 2f . Hence
we have x¯ = (−1)s ∑e+f −2i=0 di−f 2i = 2f x˜ . Next, we set Q to be a
prime number that is at least k + κ bits where k = e + f and κ is
the security parameter. To encode x˜ as a field element in ZQ , we
map x˜ to the element x¯ ∈ ZQ . Calculation can then be done using
MPC schemes that is over ZQ .
Truncation and comparison: In order to maintain the same
resolution of secretly shared values and enable comparison, two
truncation protocols are used in our work, i.e., probabilistic trunca-
tion TruncPr and deterministic truncation Trunc, as given in [18].
Probabilistic truncation supports efficient truncation as no bit-wise
operation is involved and some "raw materials" needed in the pro-
tocol can be prepared during the pre-processing phase. However,
it introdcues error with probability depending on the size of the
Least Significant Bit (LSB) after truncation. In terms of data rep-
resentation of x , the Most Significant Bit (MSB) of x determines
whether x is greater than 0 or not, which can be obtained by sim-
ply truncating the lastk−1 least significant bits. Due to the fact that
the LSB after truncation is now large, using TruncPr for this pur-
pose will yield a non-negligible error. Hence, an alternative trunca-
tion protocol is required. Deterministic truncation is less efficient
but enables truncation with zero error probability. Therefore, al-
though probabilistic truncationmay be used to avoid overflow dur-
ing multiplication computation, deterministic truncation is needed
for comparison computation. We denote by GEZ, an adapted ver-
sion of comparison protocol LTZ following the notation given in
[17] such that GEZ([x],k) = 1 if x ≥ 0, and 0 otherwise, in order
to keep the consistency with ReLU function (see Section 2.1).
Arithmetic operations: Addition and public scaling on ad-
ditive shares can be done without interaction, while maintaining
the same resolution. Multiplication can be done using Beaver triple
method (see Section 3.2) with its resolution changing from 2−f to
2−2f , which means probabilistic truncation is needed. Protocols of
division with public divisor and secretly shared divisor are also
given in [18] that offers reasonable accuracy and efficiency.
4 PROPOSED PROTOCOLS
In this section, we describe protocols to support Beaver triple con-
version and neural network training. We assume that there are two
distributed Paillier crypto-systems with different plaintext space
ZN and ZN ′ . Based on the definition of Paillier and the notation
introduced in Section 3.1, let N = p ·q where 2κ < p,q < 2κ+1, and
N ′ = p ′ ·q′ where 22κ < p ′,q′ < 22κ+1, such that N ′ > N 2. All the
multiplications involved in these protocols can be done following
the similar multiplication protocol in Paillier based Beaver triple
generation given in Section 3.2. In the rest of the paper, we write
[x]t = [〈x1〉t , ..., 〈xn 〉t ] to denote x ∈ Zt being secretly shared be-
tween all parties such that each Pi holds 〈xi 〉t and x =
∑n
i=1〈xi 〉t .
For simplicity of notation, when the context is clear, we abuse the
notation and use xi instead of 〈xi 〉t , the share of x owned by party
Pi . Similarly, when the underlying space Zt is clear, we write [x]
instead of [x]t .
4.1 Comparison over ZN
The first supporting protocol that we want to introduce is the se-
cure comparison protocol GEZN over ZN . More specifically, this
function receives a secretly shared value [x]N and the bit length
k of x . It then outputs [s]N where s = 1 if x ≥ 0 and 0 other-
wise. Note that this function can be used to compare two secretly
shared values [x]N , [y]N by computing GEZ([x − y]N ,k). This al-
gorithm is an adapted version combining LTZ protocol in [17] and
the deterministic comparison protocol in [18], which is based on
the following remark: for x with k-bit length (refer to data repre-
sentation in Section 3.3), if x < 0 then ⌊x/2k−1⌋ = 1, and if x ≥ 0
then ⌊x/2k−1⌋ = 0. This protocol, which depends on a subprotocol
BitLTC, cannot be directly applied in our case due to the difference
in the underlying space. BitLTC([xk−1], · · · , [x0], [yk−1], · · · , [y0])
is a protocol that returns 1 if x < y and 0 otherwise where x =∑k−1
i=0 xi2
i and y =
∑k−1
i=0 yi2
i are secretly shared in their binary
representations. In the scheme proposed in[1], BitLTC involves
protocols to generate random bits and random invertible integers
over the underlying finite field. In order to have a similar protocol
to BitLTC over ZN , we first describe some subprotocols that are
required, namely random bit generation and random invertible in-
teger generation modulo ZN .
Algorithm 5 describes our n-party protocol for random bit gen-
eration over ZN . The standard protocol in ZQ setting, such as
RAN2() in [25], is to take an inverse of root from squaring mod-
uloQ by dividing the initial value, i.e., x/
√
x2 ∈ {−1, 1}. However,
this may no longer works when working modulo N . Fortunately,
we can rely on existing Paillier crypto-system and Resharing pro-
tocol in SPDZ (see Section 3.2). Correctness is easily proved and
security depends on the Resharing protocol in SPDZ and Indistin-
guishability under chosen-plaintext attack (IND-CPA) security of
Paillier crypto-system which guarantees the security when n < N .
Furthermore, Enc(ai · ai+1) in Step 2 must be calculated either by
Pi or Pi+1 but not anyone else.
Algorithm 6 describes our n-party protocol for random integer
with inverse generated over ZN , which is an adapted version of
PRandInv in [1]. Algorithm 6 is built on another secure protocol
RndInt(ZN ). This protocol generates a random share [r ]N where
r is unknown to any of the parties. This can be done by letting
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Algorithm 5 Random bit generation over ZN : [a]N ← RndBitN ()
1: Each party Pi generates a uniformly random bit a0, j,k ∈ {0, 1}
and computes ci = EncN (ai ). Let b1 = a1 and d1 = c1
2: for i = 1, · · · ,n − 1 do
3: Pi sends di = Enc(bi ) to Pi+1
4: Pi+1 calculatesdi+1 = Enc(bi+1) = Enc(bi⊕ai+1) = Enc(bi+
ai+1 − 2biai+1) = PAdd(di , ci+1, PMult(PInv(di), 2ai+1))
5: end for
6: Return [a]N ← Resharinд(Enc(bn)).
each party Pi deal a sharing [ri ]N and [r ]N is defined to be [r ]N =∑N
i=1[ri ]N . Note that as long as there is one honest party, the re-
sulting [r ]N can be proved to be uniformly distributed in ZN . The
correctness of the algorithm is straightforward sinceu is invertible
if and only if x and y are also invertible. Security proof is similar
to that of PRandInv in[1].
Algorithm 6 Random integer with inverse generation over ZN :
([r ]N , [r−1]N ) ← RndInvN (N )
1: All parties call RndInt(ZN ) to generate [x]N ← RndInt(ZN ),
[y]N ← RndInt(ZN ), and then computeu ← Output([x] · [y]).
2: Repeat step 1 until u is invertible.
3: Return ([x]N ,u−1[y]N ).
Now we are ready to present our n-party protocol GEZ for com-
parison over ZN . This algorithm is an adapted version combining
LTZ protocol in [17] and the deterministic comparison protocol
in [18], which is based on the following remark: for x with k-bit
length (refer to data representation in Section 3.3), if x < 0 then
⌊x/2k−1⌋ = 1, and if x ≥ 0 then ⌊x/2k−1⌋ = 0. However this
protocol which depends on a subprotocol BitLTC, cannot be di-
rectly applied in our case due to the difference in the underlying
space. [b] ← BitLTC(([xk−1], · · · , [x0]), ([yk−1], · · · , [y0]) is a pro-
tocol that returns 1 if x < y and 0 otherwise where x =
∑k−1
i=0 xi2
i
and y =
∑k−1
i=0 yi2
i are secretly shared in their binary representa-
tions. In the scheme proposed in[1], BitLTC involves protocols to
generate random bits and random invertible integers over the un-
derlying finite field. In order to have a similar protocol to BitLTC
over ZN , we propose the protocol over ZN for generating random
bit in Algorithm 5. For random integer generation over ZN , we can
simply follow the protocol PRandInt given in [51]. Correctness and
security are proven in [17].
4.2 Wrap, modulo reduction, share conversion
In this section, we discuss the secure conversion protocol that will
help us in converting the values we generated during offline phase
(modulo N for some RSA modulusN > n) to equivalent value that
is compatiblewith the online phase (moduloQ for a primeQ). More
specifically, given [a]N , the additive share of a secret value a mod-
ulo N , we want to calculate [a]Q , the additive share of the same
secret value modulo Q for some prime Q . First, for simplicity, we
discuss about the transformation of the secret sharing values. Note
Algorithm 7 Comparison over ZN : [s]N ← GEZN ([x],k)
1: For each i ∈ [0, ...,k − 1], all parties calculate [ri ] = RndBitN ()
in parallel, and thus obtain [r ′] = ∑k−2i=0 2i · [ri ].
2: All parties calculate [r ′′] = RndIntN (κ + 1).
3: All parties publish c ← Output(2k−1 · [r ′′]+ [r ′]+ 2k−1 + [x]),
and then calculate c ′ = c mod 2k−1.
4: All parties call [u] = BitLTCN (c ′, (
[
r ′
k−2
]
, ...,
[
r ′0
])).
5: All parties compute [x ′] = c ′ − [r ′] + 2k−1[u].
6: All parties compute [s] = 1 + ([x] − [x ′]) (2−k+1 mod N ).
that initially, we want our secret value and its shares to be an el-
ement in S1 =
{−n−12 , · · · , n−12 } . For simplicity of our argument
in this section, we transform all these values to be non-negative
value in S2 = {0, · · · ,n − 1} via congruence operation. Note that
this does not change the correctness of any sharing and transfor-
mation between the two formats can be done trivially.
Note that if [x]N = (xN1 , · · · ,xNn ), there exists δ ∈ {0, · · · ,n −
2,n − 1} such that
x = xN1 + · · · + xNn − δN . (1)
Hence if we want to consider the equation moduloQ,we will have
x ≡ (x
N
1 (mod Q)) + · · · + (xNn (mod Q))
−(δ (mod Q)) · (N (mod Q)) (mod Q). (2)
So in order to calculate [x]Q from [x]N , we need to calculate
the value of δ which can be rewritten as δ =
⌊∑
n
i=1 x
N
i
N
⌋
.
Now we discuss how we can calculate the value of δ . Note that
Equation (1) will not yield the value of δ if it is computed modulo
N . Intuitively, if we consider the equation moduloN ′ for some N ′
such that N ′ > N 2, the equation does not become equivalence and
hence we can use it to calculate δ . Once we have the equationmod-
ulo N ′, we can find the maximum value of j such that
∑n
i=1 x
N
i −
jN ≥ 0. It is easy to see that δ = ∑n−1j=0 (∑ni=1 xNi − jN ≥ 0). Now
since the equation is moduloN ′, the calculationwill give us [δ ]N ′ .
We let this procedure to be called [δ ]N ′ ← LiWrap([x]N ,N ′)
which is only applicable if N ′ > N 2 > n2. Algorithm 8 provides
the complete LiWrap protocol. Note that the security of the pro-
tocol is guaranteed due to the security of GEZ protocol and the
fact that no intermediate values is revealed.
Algorithm 8 LiftWrap: [δ ]N ′ ← LiWrapN ([x]N ,N ′)
1: Each party Pi computes 〈x ′〉N
′
i = 〈x〉Ni mod N ′.
2: For each i ∈ {1, ...,n − 1}, all parties compute [δi ]N
′
=
GEZN ′
(
[x ′]N ′ − [i · N ]N ′ , l
)
, where l = ⌈log2 N ′⌉.
3: Return [δ ]N ′ = ∑n−1i=1 [δi ]N ′ .
The next step is to convert [δ ]N ′ to [δ ]N . In other words, we
need a secure conversion protocol DropMod to convert a secretly
shared value [x]N ′ back to [x]N where N ′ > N 2 > n2. In order
to complete this, first, we observe that given [δ ]N ′ = (δ1, · · · , δn),
setting yi ≡ xi − δiN (mod N ′), we have
∑n
i=1 yi = x (mod N ′).
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In other words, for any [x]N ,we can calculate [x]N ′ . Let this proce-
dure be called [x]N ′ ← LiMod([x]N ,N ′)which is only applicable
if N ′ > N 2 > n2. Algorithm 9 provides the complete LiMod pro-
tocol. The security is guaranteed based on the security guarantee
of LiWrap protocol.
Algorithm 9 Lift shares in ZN to ZN ′ : [x]N ′ ←
LiModN ([x]N ,N ′)
1: Parties jointly compute [δ ]N ′ = (δ ′1, · · · ,δ ′n) =
LiWrapN ([x]N ,N ′).
2: For each i ∈ {1, · · · ,n}, having xi and δ ′i (the shares of [x]N
and [δ ]N ′ respectively), Pi calculates x ′i ≡ xi −δ ′iN (mod N ′).
3: Return [x]N ′ = (x ′1, · · · , x ′n ).
Now we are ready to discuss the last subprotocol needed for the
Wrap function, [x]N ← DropMod([x]N ′ ,N ). Intuitively, assuming
the existence of the protocols RndInt and LiMod over ZN , we
can generate a random value r ∈ ZN that is secretly shared twice,
once over ZN and another over ZN ′ . Having [r ]N and [r ]N ′, we
can calculate and reveal the value of y ≡ x + r (mod N )′. Taking
z ≡ y (mod N ), a simple algebraic manipulation gives us z − [r ]N
gives us a valid secret sharing of x over ZN . Since the only value
that is revealed is masked using a fresh secretly shared random
value [r ]N ′ where r < N , along with the security guarantees of
the other subprotocols being used, security is guaranteed if x < N .
Algorithm 10 provides a complete DropMod protocol.
Algorithm 10 Convert shares in ZN ′ to ZN : [x]N ←
DropModN ([x]N
′
,N )
1: Parties jointly compute [r ]N = RndInt(ZN ).
2: Parties jointly compute [r ]N ′ = LiMod([r ]N ,N ′)
3: Parties locally compute [y]N ′ = [x]N ′ + [r ]N ′ , publish their
shares of [y]N ′ and recover y ∈ ZN ′
4: Return [x]N = y − [r ]N .
Note that we can apply DropMod to obtain [δ ]N from [δ ]N ′ .We
note that in this use, DropMod is secure since δ < n < N . So this
also guarantees the security of the protocol [δ ]N ← WrapN ([x]N ,N ′).
Algorithm 11 provides the complete WrapN protocol.
Algorithm 11Wrap over ZN : [δ ]N ← WrapN ([x]N ,N ′)
1: Parties jointly compute [δ ]N ′ = LiWrapN ([x]N ,N ′).
2: Parties jointly compute and return [δ ]N =
DropModN ([δ ]N
′
,N ).
Note that the conversion protocols LiMod and DropMod are
only securely applicable in very restrictive case. More specifically,
LiMod can only convert from ZS to ZS ′ where S
′ > S2 > n2 and
GEZ must be well defined over ZS . So in other words, S must be ei-
ther an RSAmodulus or a prime. On the other hand, DropMod can
only convert from ZS ′ to ZS with S and S
′ having the same require-
ments as the ones in LiMod. Furthermore, DropModS ([x]S
′
, S) is
only secure when x < S .
Recall that ourmain objective of this part is to have a secure con-
version protocol to convert a secret sharing [x]N to [x]Q where N
is an RSA modulus while Q is a prime. Since this needs to be used
to convert secret sharing of random values or Beaver Triple gener-
atedmoduloN , in order to have all possible random values modulo
Q, we need to have N > Q . Note that if we use DropMod for this
purpose, the value of N needs to be much bigger than Q, more
specifically, N > Q2. In the following, we propose another conver-
sion protocol ShaConv which can accomplish this goal securely as
long as N > Q .
Following Equation (2), having [x]N = (x1, · · · , xn ), the first
n terms can be calculated locally by each party Pi . Now in or-
der for the conversion to be completed, we need the last term,
(δ (mod Q)) · (N (mod Q)). Recall that the only information we
have about δ is its secret sharing modulo N , [δ ]N . Note that to be
able to calculate [δ ]Q · (N (mod Q)),we need to first convert [δ ]N
to [δ ]Q . Note that we can use a variant of DropMod to achieve
this. However, this can only be achieved securely if δ < Q . So
in order to guarantee this, in our discussion, we will assume that
n < Q < N <
√
N ′. Now suppose that we have [δ ]N and we
would like to calculate [δ ]Q . Since we do not have the guarantee
that Q < N 2, we cannot apply DropMod directly. Instead, we will
again use the space ZN
′
for this purpose. More specifically, after
the calculation of LiWrap to obtain [δ ]N ′ , we can directly call
DropMod to obtain [δ ]Q instead of [δ ]N . Now once [δ ]Q is ob-
tained, we can obtain [δ ]Q · (N (mod Q)) completing the calcula-
tion of Equation (2). It is easy to see that since all the subprotocols
being used here are secure, the protocol that calculates Equation (2)
we have just discussed is secure. The complete protocol of ShaConv
can be found in Algorithm 12.
Algorithm 12 Share conversion: [x]Q ← ShaConv([x]N ,Q,N ′)
1: Parties jointly compute [δ ]N ′ = LiWrap([x]N ,N ′)
2: Parties jointly compute [δ ]Q = (δ1, · · · ,δn ) =
DropModQ ([δ ]N
′
,Q)
3: for i = 1, · · · ,n do
4: Pi possesses xi and δi , the i-th share of [x]N and [δ ]Q re-
spectively
5: Pi locally computes x
′
i ≡ xi − δi · (N (mod Q)) (mod Q).
6: end for
7: Return [x]Q = (x ′1, · · · , x ′n ).
Note that Algorithm 12 can be used for anyQ and N securely as
long as they satisfy the following requirements: (i) n < Q < N ., (ii)
we have a secure GEZ protocol moduloN ., and (iii) we have secure
RndInt and GEZ protocols moduloQ . Due to this observation, we
have that ShaConv is applicable as long asQ and N are either RSA
moduli or prime numbers.
4.3 Beaver triple conversion
Share conversion is not trivial in terms of MPC as proved in [11],
let alone Beaver triple conversion. Inspired by [21], several share
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conversion protocols have been developed. To convert a sharing
over ZQ to a sharing over ZQ ′ , we can rely on the method of [6]
and themixed-protocol framework given in ABY [30] which gener-
alizes the conversion protocols between different sharing schemes
including Arithmetic sharing, Boolean sharing, and Yao’s garbled
circuit. However, for additive sharing of integer over ZQ , the con-
version protocol follows the scheme ZQ → Z2t → ZQ ′ , which
involves bit decomposition and bit sharing conversion over a field
to another field [29]. These approaches are complicated and expen-
sive. In our work, we do not use these protocols to construct share
conversion, instead, we rely on two Paillier crypto-systems which
enables us to convert Beaver triples from ZN to ZQ .
First we observe that given a triple ([a]N , [b]N , [c]N ), we have
c ≡ ab (mod N ) or equivalently, ab = c + σN for some integer
σ such that |σ | ≤ n − 1. Similar to the discussion of δ in the pre-
vious section, in order to get the value of σ , we need to lift the
equation modulo N ′ for some N ′ > N 2 > n2. Using the algorithm
LiMod described above, we can obtain ([a]N ′, [b]N ′, [c]N ′). Then
[σN ]N ′ = [ab − c]N ′ . Note that it is not secure to use DropMod
to obtain [σN ]Q from [σN ]N ′ even if N ′ is an RSA modulus or
a prime. This is because it is impossible that σN < Q . Hence
we will need to use ShaConv to achieve this. In order to make
this possible, we require that the N ′ we choose to be either an
RSA modulus or a prime. Once we have [σ ]Q , it is easy to see
that [ab]Q ≡ [c]Q + [δN ]Q (mod Q). This protocol, denoted by
TripConv is secure due to the security of all the subprotocols in-
volved. The complete protocol of TripConv can be found in Algo-
rithm 13.
Algorithm 13 Beaver triple conversion: ([a′]Q , [b ′]Q , [c ′]Q ) ←
TripConv(([a]N , [b]N , [c]N ),Q)
1: Parties agree on N ′ such that N ′ > N 2 and N ′ is either an
RSA modulus or a prime. Parties also agree on N ′′ such that
N ′′ > (N ′)2.
2: Parties jointly compute ([a]Q , [b]Q , [c]Q ) =
ShaConv(([a]N , [b]N , [c]N ),Q,N ′).
3: Parties jointly compute ([a]N ′, [b]N ′, [c]N ′ =
LiMod([a]N , [b]N , [c]N ,N ′)
4: Parties jointly compute [σN ]N ′ = [a]N ′ · [b]N ′ − [c]N ′
5: Parties jointly compute [σN ]Q = ShaConv([σN ]N ′ ,Q,N ′′)
6: Set [c ′]Q = [c]Q + [δN ]Q .
7: Return ([a]Q , [b]Q , [c ′]Q ).
4.4 Probabilistic bit generation
Algorithm 14 describes our n-party protocol for probabilistic ran-
dom bit generation over ZQ such that [b]Q = PrRndBitQ (p), where
b = 0 with probability p, and b = 1 with probability 1 − p. The
generated bit share can be used for computation in dropout layer
in neural network. Note that a ∈ ZQ , thus a − ⌊p · Q⌋ < 0 with
probability approximately p, and a − ⌊p · Q⌋ ≥ 0 with probability
approximately 1 − p. Therefore, GEZQ ([a − ⌊p · Q⌋], l) = 0 with
approximate probability p and GEZQ ([a − ⌊p ·Q⌋], l) = 1 with ap-
proximate probability 1−p. Note that we can have a more accurate
probability by using a larger Q .
Algorithm 14 Probabilistic bit generation over ZQ : [b]Q ←
PrRndBitQ (p)
1: All parties deal a random sharing [a]Q , where a ∈ ZQ .
2: All parties calculate [b]Q = GEZQ ([a]Q − ⌊p · Q⌋, l), where
l = ⌈log2Q⌉.
3: Return [b]Q .
5 MPC FOR NEURAL NETWORK
In this section, we describe various protocols to support efficient
secure neural network training based on protocols given in Sec-
tion 3.2, Section 3.3, and Section 4. Our protocols focus on n-party
setting where correctness and security are guaranteed by our sup-
porting protocols. Compared with MPC based neural network pro-
tocols in SecureML [47] and SecureNN [59], our protocols are ap-
plicable to a larger number of parties. Furthermore, compared to
SecureNN[59], our protocols do not require external parties to as-
sist the computation. Note that all the secret shares in this section
are over finite field ZQ .
5.1 Linear and convolutional layer
Since operations in linear layer and convolutional layer are exactly
multiply-and-accumulates on matrix [19], all parties can jointly
call addition and multiplication protocols in SPDZ to make an effi-
cient evaluation. Note thatmultiplications onmatrix rely onmatrix
Beaver triples such that ar×s · bs×t = cr×t , where ar×s , bs×t , cr×t
are matrix. Indeed, matrix Beaver triple generation involves ex-
tra multiply-and-accumulates compared with that of single Beaver
triple, hence takes more time. However, this can be done during
offline phase, thus greatly improves the efficiency of evaluating
multiply-and-accumulates in online phase.
5.2 ReLU with derivative
In neural network, ReLU function is a function that depends on the
non-negativity of the input such that
ReLU(x) =
{
x x ≥ 0
0 x < 0
Therefore, evaluating ReLU function boils down to comparison
between x and 0. In addition, it is easy to see that the derivative of
ReLU, denoted by DReLU, can be formulated as follows.
DReLU(x) =
{
1 x ≥ 0
0 x < 0
Therefore we can conclude that for any matrix x of any size,
DReLU(x) = s = (x ≥ 0)where the comparison is done entry-wise
and ReLU(x) = x × s where × is an entry-wise matrix multiplica-
tion. Following this argument, the parties can then consecutively
calculate ReLU and DReLU given a secretly shared input [x]Q fol-
lowing the protocol described in Algorithm 15. We note that the
security of this protocol is guaranteed by the security of all the
subprotocols being used during its calculation.
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Algorithm 15 ReLU: ([y], [s]) ← ReLU([x])
1: All parties call GEZ([x]) to obtain [s] = [x ≥ 0].
2: All parties call MulTrip([x], [s]) to obtain [y] = [x]× [s]where
× represents entry-wise matrix multiplication.
3: Return [y] and [s].
5.3 Maxpool with derivative
Maxpool is a layer of neural network that outputs the maximum
values of various submatrices of the input matrix determined by
several parameters, namely filter size and stride. Since each sub-
matrix can be handled independently in parallel, we simply focus
on finding the maximum value of a submatrix, which can be rep-
resented as a list of s elements. To find such maximum value, we
use the divide and conquer strategy where the comparison can be
done in log s rounds. To simplify the description of the protocol,we
first assume that s = 2p for some positive integer p. In each round,
we can pair up the elements and keep the larger element for the
next round of comparison. This way, the number of elements to
be compared in each round is reduced by half from the previous
round. This can be done until we are left with one element, which
is the largest element required as the output of Maxpool.
In order to enable backward propagation, we will need the de-
rivative of Maxpool,which we denote by DMaxpool. Suppose that
given an input list x = (x1, · · · , xs ) with Maxpool(x) = x∗ where
x∗ is the i∗-th entry of x. Then DMaxpool(x) = v = (v1, · · · ,vs )
where vi∗ = 1 andvj = 0 for all other j . it is easy to see that the in-
termediate comparison results from the protocol Maxpool can be
used to provide “path” from the maximum value to the xi which
is the maximum value. So multiplying all the intermediate com-
parison results in the path from the maximum value to any of the
values will return 0 if the value is not the maximum value while it
will be 1 in exactly one of the paths, as required. Our complete pro-
tocols for Maxpool and DMaxpool can be found in Algorithms 16
and 17 respectively. Here comp is a s×log s matrix with its i-th row
storing all the intermediate comparison results in the path from xi
to the maximum value.
5.4 Dropout with derivative
Dropout layer is performedby dropping out some valueswith some
fixed probability p such that
Dropout(x) =
{
0 probability p
x/(1 − p) probability 1 − p
Algorithm 18 describes our n-party protocol for Dropout which
outputs the product of input matrix [x], matrix of probabilistic ran-
dom bit [b], and public scaling factor c = (1−p)−1which is encoded
to c¯ using the fixed point method discussed in Section 3.3. Since
in Step 1, the matrix of probabilistic random bits [b] can be gener-
ated in the offline phase of SPDZ, only one multiplication is needed
for the evaluation of the Dropout layer. In addition, according to
the definition of Dropout and backward propagation, the deriva-
tive of Dropout is to propagate the gradients to the nodes except
for the nodes that drop their values in the forward propagation.
Therefore, DDropout can be simply obtained from the calculation
of corresponding Dropout layer, i.e., DDropout([x]) = [b]× c¯. Here
Algorithm 16 Maxpool: ([y], [comp]) ← Maxpool([x] =
([x1], · · · , [xs ]), s), s = 2p for some positive integer p
1: for i = j, · · · , s do
2: Parties set [y(0, j)] = [xi ].
3: end for
4: for i = 1, · · · ,p do
5: for j = 1, · · · , s
2i
do
6: All parties compute [ci, j ] = GEZ([y(i−1,2j−1) − y(i−1,2j)])
7: Parties set [y(i, j)] = [y(i−1,2j)] + [ci, j ] · ([y(i−1,2j−1) −
y(i−1,2j)])
8: for k = 1, · · · , 2i−1 do
9: Parties set [comp((j − 1) · 2i + k, i)] = [ci, j ] + [0] and
[comp((j − 1) · 2i + 2i−1 + k, i)] = [1 − ci, j ] + [0]
10: end for
11: end for
12: end for
13: Return ([y(p,1)], [comp]).
Algorithm 17 DMaxpool: [ind] ← DMaxpool([x], [comp])
1: for i = 1, · · · , s do
2: Parties compute [indi] =
∏p
j=1[comp(i, j)]
3: end for
4: Return [ind] = ([ind1], · · · , [inds ]).
[b] is the matrix with random bit entries used in the correspond-
ing Dropout layer while c¯ is the fixed point encoding of a public
scaling factor c = (1 − p)−1.
Algorithm 18 Dropout: ([y], [b]) ← Dropout([x],p)
1: All parties call PrRndBit(p) to generate a matrix which has the
same size of [x] of secret sharing probabilistic random bit [b].
2: All parties compute [y] = [x] × [b] × c¯ where c¯ is the fixed
point encoding of c = (1 − p)−1 and the operator × represents
the entry-wise multiplication of involved matrices.
3: Return ([y], [b]).
6 COMMUNICATION AND ROUNDS
We summarize the communication and round complexity of our
neural network training protocols for 3PC compared with those of
SecureNN [59] in Table 1.We use the same ℓ as the length of bits for
data representation for the protocols both in SecureNN and ours.
P and Q are the finite field size of SecureNN and our’s protocol re-
spectively. Linearr ,s,t denotes multiplication between two matrix
of dimension r ×s with s×t . Conv2dm,i, f ,o denotes the operations
in convolutional layer with input matrix of dimensionm ×m, i in-
put channels, o output channels, and a filter of dimension f × f .
Maxpoolj and DMaxpoolj denote maxpool with its derivative over
j elements. In addition, Dropoutj and DDropoutj denote dropout
with its derivative over j elements, which are not available in Se-
cureNN.
Note that (i) compared with SecureNN, we encode data in a
larger finite field ZQ where Q is approximately ℓ + κ bits, as our
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design relies on SPDZ which is more general than the specific de-
sign of SecureNN that enables protocols running over a small ring
or field, and (ii) we also do the same operation on MAC which in-
creases the communication cost, although Beaver triples are gener-
ated offline in our protocol thus do not need a party as "assistant",
i.e., P2 in [59], which saves the communication rounds. We can
observe the round improvement of DMaxpool which is because
we use a general constant-round comparison protocol instead of
the protocol in [59] consisting of share conversion, reconstruction,
and multiplication. In addition, the round improvement of DReLU
and DMaxpool comes from the increase of storage of intermediate
comparison results, while Dropout and DDropout save the rounds
by moving some steps to the offline phase of SPDZ.
7 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we present our experimental results for secure con-
volutional neural network training.
System setting.Our prototype is tested over three Linux work-
stations with an Intel Xeon Silver 4110 CPU (2.10GHz) and 128 GB
of RAM, running CentOS7 in the same region. In this LAN setting,
the average latency is 0.216 ms and the average bandwidth is 1.25
GB/s. In our experiment, data is represented in 64 bits including
12 bits (with sign bit) for integer part and 52 bits for fractional
part. Our protocols are implemented using Gmpy2 [36] which is a
Python version of GMP multiple-precision library [2] and several
other standard libraries. The ring size of the two Paillier crypto-
systems are set be greater than 21048 and 22048 respectively and
the finite field sizeQ is set to be a prime which is greater than 2145.
Lastly, we set the security parameter κ to be 80. Note that to enable
the comparison between SecureNN and our protocols, our exper-
iments use the same bit length to represent the data ℓ as the one
used in the experiment conducted in SecureNN[59].
Neural network architecture. We implement two types of
neural network: a deep neural network and a convolutional neural
network. The former is the same model as used in [59] and [47],
with architecture of fully connected layer (784, 128) - ReLU - fully
connected layer (128, 10)- ReLU. The latter has the architecture of
padding (32, 32) - convolutional layer (4, 28, 28) - ReLU - Maxpool
(4, 14, 14) - convolutional layer (12, 10, 10) - ReLU - dropout - Max-
pool (12, 5, 5) - flatten (1, 300) - fully connected layer (300, 120)
- fully connected layer (120, 10) - ReLU. Both neural networks are
implemented based on reproduced SecureNN protocols in [59] and
our protocols, while plaintext implementation is based on Numpy
[50]. We use MNIST dataset [42] which consists of 70,000 black-
white hand-written digit images of size 28×28 in 10 classes. In our
experiment, 60,000 images are used for training and 10,000 images
are used for testing. Note that we only give the performance eval-
uation on neural network training, i.e., the online phase of SPDZ,
as "raw materials" to be used can be prepared in the offline phase.
As shown in Table 2, with batch size of 64, our protocol offers a
prediction accuracy of 97.75% after 10 epochs for DNNwhich takes
2.92 hours. For CNN, it takes 16.50 hours to complete 10 epochs
training and achieves accuracy of 98.08%. Table 3 shows the train-
ing time of 1 epoch with different batch size for DNN and CNN.
Table 4 summarizes the training comparison between our protocol,
SecureNN, and plaintext in terms of training time and communi-
caiton cost. We can observe that our protocol improves the threat
model from semi-honest to dishonest majority with overheads of
around 2X in LAN setting.
8 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a new scheme with several primitives
for secure neural network training in malicious majority setting
leveraging on SPDZ. Our experimental results show that our pro-
tocols offer active security with affordable overheads of around
2X in LAN time compared with existing schemes in semi-honest
setting. In addition, we propose a scheme for Beaver triple conver-
sion from a ring ZN to a finite field ZQ to enable MAC checking
in SPDZ, relying on two instances of Paillier crypto-systems.
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